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BILLS AND NOTES-FORGED SIGNATURE OF DRAWER-RIGHT OF DRAWEE TO
RECOVER PAYMENT MADE fro HOLDER.-The plaintiff bank forwarded a check
received from a depositor to its correspondent for collection. Two weeks
after payment had been made by the drawee bank, the latter discovered that
the drawer's signature had been forged and demanded, sued for, and recovered
from the collecting bank the amount of the check, this plaintiff taking active
part in the defense. The present suit was then brought to recover from the
drawee the same sum. Held, that the plaintiff was barred by the judgment,
with a dictum that a complete defense was available in the previous action,
since the act of 1849 permitted recovery by a drawee of payments made upon
forged paper only when the drawee was not negligent so as to cause the holder
to change his position. Bank of Portland v. Bank of Philadelphia (ig2o, Pa.)
uio Atl. 792.
Actions by a drawee for the recovery of money paid upon a check in which
the drawer's signature was subsequently discovered to have been forged, are
governed by rules on which decisions involving forged indorsements and
alterations have no bearing. White v. Bank (1876) 64 N. Y. 316; IO L. R. A.
(N. s.) 49, note. Most jurisdictions have followed the leading case on this
point, which denied recovery on the ground that it was incumbent upon the
drawee to satisfy himself that the signature was genuine before accepting or
paying the bill. Price v. Neal (1762,, K. B.) 3 Burr. I354; Woodward,
Quasi-Contracts (913) sec. 8o. This rule is based, not merely upon estoppel
or the negligence of the drawee, as is often stated, but upon public policy,
namely, that, as between the drawee and holders in due course, the drawee
bank should be deemed the place of finalsettlement. Germania Bank v. Boutell
(1895) 6o Minn. i8g, 62 N. W. 327. The doctrine does not apply when the
holder in any way contributed to the success of the fraud. Rouvant v. San
Antonio Bank (1885) 63 Tex. 61o. Nor is it available to a holder who paid
no value. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven (Igo9) I96 N. Y. 487, 89 N. E.
xo8z A few states have held that the drawee may recover unless he is guilty
of negligence resulting in loss to the holder. First Nat. Bank v. Bank of
Wyndmere (i9o6) 15 N. D. 299, io8 N. W. 546. Pennsylvania obtained this
result by statute, as seen in the principal case. Section 62 of the N. I. L. provides
that the acceptance of a bill admits the genuineness of the drawer's signature.
It is generally held that -payment of a check must necessarily include acceptance
thereof and that this section therefore adopted the doctrine of Price v. Neal,
supra. Bank of Rolla v. Bank of Salem (igio) i4i Mo. App. 719, 125 S. W.
513; Brannan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. I92o) see. 62. One
state, at least, which formerly adhered to the "change of position" rule now
accepts this view. Cherokee Bank v. Trust Co. (1912) 33 Okla. 342, 125 Pac. 464.
A few have avoided doing so through most fallacious reasoning, for example,
by holding that the holder warrants the validity of the draft by his negotiation,
or indorsement, of it to the drawee. First Nat. Bank v. Brule Nat. Bank (1917)
38 S. D. 396, 161 N. W. 616. But such a warranty arises only in case of a sale
of the instrument, and not when it is presented to the drawee for payment.
Dedham Bank v. Everett Bank (i9oi) 177 Mass. 392, 59 N. E. 62. The Penn-
sylvania courts, relying on the section of the N. I. L. which provides that an
acceptance must be in writing, consider that only certification can amount to
acceptance, so that their existing law was not altered. Union Bank v. Franklin
Bank (1915) 249 Ra. 375, 94 Atl. io85. Whether correct or not, this point




BILLS AND NOTES-FoRGED SIGNATURE OF PAYEE-INTENT OF FORGER AS TEST
OF PAYEE'S Ficrmous CHARAcTER.-The plaintiff's agent, who had authority
to draw on the plaintiff's credit to pay for grain bought in the course of
business, fraudulently made and negotiated a bill of exchange payable to the
order of one Andrew Molch. The agent never intended Molch to have any
interest in the transaction and forged Molch's name to an indorsement prior to
presentment. The plaintiff, as drawee, without knowledge of the agent's intent,
accepted and paid the bill when presented for collection by the defendant
bank, under the mistaken belief that its agent had drawn upon it to pay for grain
bought of Molch and that Molch's signature was genuine. The plaintiff now
seeks to recover from the defendant bank on the ground that the payee's name
was forged. Held, that the'plaintiff could not recover, as the payee was ficti-
tious. American Hominy Co. v. Bank (i92o, Ill.) 128 N. E. 391.
Under section 9, paragraph 3, of the N. I. L. an instrument is payable to
bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious person. An existing
person may be considered fictitious within the meaning of the statute-where he
has no interest and is intended to have none in the transaction. Snyder v.
Bank (i908) 221 Pa. 599, 70 Adt. 876. In most jurisdictions the intent of the
drawer or maker in inserting the name of the payee is the controlling test
as to whether or not the payee is fictitious. Shipman v. Bank (1891) 126 N. Y.
318, 27 N. E. 37i; Grand Lodge v. Bank (1917) 1Ol Kan. 369, i66 Pac. 49o;
8 C. J. 179. Some courts impute an agent's knowledge to his principal. Equitable
Life Ass. Co. v. Bank (i916, Mo. App.) 181 S. W. 1176. But the better rule
is contra. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Bank (igig, Calif.) 182 Pac. 293. Under
the common law a payee is not fictitious unless the drawee or acceptor has
knowledge of his fictitious character at the time of payment or acceptance.
Bennett v. Farnell (i8o7, N. P.) I Camp. 13o, and note. The N. I. L., however,
is silent on this point. Kulp, The Fictitious Payee (i92o) 18 MICH. L. Rtv.
296, 304. In England such knowledge was held not to be essential under the
Bills of Exchange Act. Bank of England v. Vagliano [i8gi, H. LI] A. C. 1O7.
In this country the courts appear to be tending toward the English rule in
accord with the principal case. Trust Co. v. Bank (i9o8) 127 App. Div. 515,
112 N. Y. Supp. 84. Yet the requirement under the common law, whereby
the party to be charged must know the payee to be fictitious, is clearly a. guard
against fraud. See Greeley, Fictitious Payees in Forged Checks or Bills (19o9)
3 ILT L. REV. 331. In cases similar to the principal case it would seem to be
unnecessary to hold the payee to be fictitious when the same result could
more logically be reached on the doctrines of agency and estoppel. See
Shuttle Co. v. Bank (I915) 134 Tenn. 379, 183 S. W. i006.
CONTRAcrs-MUTUALITY-CONTRACT VOID FOR UNcERTAINTY AS TO .QUAN-
Trn-.-The plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a contract whereby the
defendant agreed to sell and deliver to the plaintiffs their entire consumption
of vulcanized fibre and insulating papers for one year. The plaintiffs made
orders upon the defendant for definite quantities of the article, which orders
the defendant refused to fill. Held, that the contract was void for lack of
mutuality and certainty, since the quantity contracted for must be reasonably
certain or capable of being approximately ascertained at the time of making
the agreement. American Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co.
(I92O, Del.) IiI AtI. 29o.
The term mutuality, or lack of mutuality, has been used to apply to a number
of situations in the law of contract. (I) Where there was no consideration.
Blanton v. Forrest City Mfg. Co. (i919) 138 Ark. 5o8, 212 S. W. 330. In such
a case it would be clearer and more accurate to say that there was no contract,
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instead of saying that the contract was void for lack of mutuality. See Gross v.
Stampler (1917, Sup. Ct.) 165 N. Y. Supp. 214, 215. (2) Where there was a
real unilateral contract, that is, where one party was under no duty to do any-
thing. Ross-Vaughan Tobacco Co. v. Johnson (ii8) 182 Ky. 325, 206 S. W.
487; Majestic Coal Co. v. Anderson (1919, Ala.) 82 So. 483; see Anson,
Contract (Corbin's ed. igig) 25. But, by the very nature of a unilateral contract
mutuality of duty cannot exist Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty
Co. (9o9) 22o Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400. (3) Where the legal relations of the
parties to a bilateral contract were not reciprocal. Weil v. Chicago Tool Co.
(1919) 138 Ark. 534, 212 S. W. 313; City of Pocatello v. Fidelity Co. (192o,
C. C. A. 9th) 267 Fed. 181. However, a promise creating a legal duty on the
promisor is a sufficient consideration for another promise regardless of the nature
of that promise or'the legal relations it creates. For example, a contract in which
the defendants promised to ship to the plaintiff for sale on commission the entire
output of their coal mine, while the plaintiff promised to act as agent and to
guarantee all collections, was held to be enforceable, although the plaintiff did
not promise that he would succeed in selling any coal. Warren v. Coal Co.
(1919) 2o0 Mo. App. 442, 207 S. W. 883; Neola Elevator Co. v. Kruckman,
(1919, Iowa) 171 N. W. 743; see (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 517. (4) Where
the equitable remedies were not mutual. See Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie
(1902) 202 Pa. 210, 215, 51 Atl. 973. (5) Where, as in the instant case,
the term mutuality is sued synonymously with certainty. At best the use of the
term mutuality to express so many legal concepts is unfortunate. In the forma-
tion of any contract there must be an accepted offer or a promise for which
consideration is given; and in either case there must exist the element of
certainty, or there is no contract Woods v. Evans (1885) 113 Ill. 186; Elks v.
North State Ins. Co. (i912) 159 N. C. 619, 75 S. E. 8o8. An agreement is
never rendered unenforceable by lack of mutuality, even where mutuality means
certainty, unless it creates a want of a definite consideration. But in such a
case there is no contract. See Gross v. Stampler, supra; Raney Lumber Co. v.
Schroeder Lumber Co. (1916, C. C. A. 7th) 237 Fed. 39, 43. When the aggregate
of legal relations called a contract has come into existence, a further discus-
sion of mutuality is unnecessary and confusing. It might have argued in the
instant case that there was a series of bilateral contracts, each being created
by the placing of an order for a definite quantity. Such contracts should not
be held void for want of certainty. See (1917) 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 795.
CONTRACTS-PERFORMANCE ON TIME A CONDITION PRECEDENT To DuTY TO PAY-
CONDITION NOT WAIVED BY IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANmC-The plaintiff
company sought to recover the contract price of an electric crane. The contract
required delivery by a certain date and protected the manufacturer against suit
for damage arising from nonfulfilment by reason of any cause beyond its control.
The buyer had refused to- accept the crane because it was delivered late. The
court assumed that the delay was caused by priority orders of the government.
Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel
Corporation (192o, N. D. N. Y.) 266 Fed. 945.
The plaintiff contended that by implication from the clause which protected
it in case of unavoidable delay, the time for its performance was extended
beyond the period stipulated in the contract. Impossibility of performance
excuses non-performance. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hoyt (1893) 149 U. S. I,
13 Sup. Ct 779; Field & Co. v. Haven, (1918) 36 Calif. App. 669, 173 Pac. 108.
Increased difficulty, even though due to war conditions, does not excuse non-
performance. W ilson & Co. v. Tennants [1917] I K. B. 2o8; Richards & Co. v.
Wreschner (915, Sup. Ct) 156 N. Y. Supp. io54. Such a clause as that in
question has been held to protect a manufacturer against an action for damages,
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where the delay was caused by government priority orders placed under the
National Defence Act, U. S. COmp. St. i916, secs. 3 iIgf-3riih, and the Navy
Appropriation Act 1917, ch. i8o. Moore & Tierney v. Roxford Knitting Co.
(i918, N. D. N. Y.) 250 Fed. 278; Mawhinney v. Millbrock Woolen Mills
(i918, Sup. Ct.) Io5 Misc. 99, 172 N. Y. Supp. 461; see COMMENTS (1919) 28
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 399. Even in the absence of such contractual provision no
action would lie for damages so caused. Lipton v. Ford [1917] 2 K. B. 647.
But a manufacturer who for some legitimate reason has not performed on time
cannot charge the purchaser as for a performance. Excuse is not a performance.
The court in the principal case based its decision on the ground that time was
of the essence of the contract. It has been held that performance by the date
set in the contract was important only as a condition precedent to the purchaser's
duty to pay for the goods, if delivered. Rosenthal v. Empire Brick and Supply
Co. (1907, Sup. Ct.) 54 Misc. 633, IO4 N. Y. Supp. 769. Where the impossibility
was only temporary, the obligation has been held not to be discharged but, at
most, suspended. Vorhaus v. City National Securities Co. (1917, Sup. Ct.)
167 N. Y. Supp. 736; Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo Mexican Co. ti916, H. L.]
2 A. C. 397. Whether a manufacturer whose performance had been temporarily
excused, could, after revival of his obligation, compel a buyer who had not
objected to the delay to accept delivery, is not decided in the instant case,
because upon default of the plaintiff the buyer had given notice of his election
to rescind. Here the plaintiff's delay was not a breach of its duty, for its
promise was expressly limited by the clause concerning unavoidable delay.
Its delay was a nonfulfillment of a condition precedent to any right against
the buyer, because time was of the essence of the contract. The decision
seems sound and protects a purchaser to whom, notwithstanding the manu-
facturer's justification for delay, performance on time is essential. The seller
was privileged not to pay damages for delay; the buyer was privileged not to
take and pay for the articles.
DAMAGEs-LIQuIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTY-CONTRACT FOR EXCHANGE OF
LAND.-The plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement for the exchange
of land. The contract contained a covenant by which the plaintiff agreed to
turn over farm produce, valued at $28o, to the defendant. The defendant refused
to carry out the agreement and the plaintiff brought this action for breach of
contract. At the trial the plaintiff.offered no eviaence of damage, but relied on
a clause of the contract which provided that if either party should fail to
perform "all of the agreements herein contained, the said party shall forfeit
the sum of $5oo as liquidated damages." Held, that the plaintiff should not
recover, as the sum stipulated was a penalty. Ayers v. Houston (12O, App.
Div.) 183 N. Y. Supp. 8o8.
Probably the real test as to whether an amount stipulated in a contract for
the exchange of land is a penalty or liquidated damages, regardless of the
language used or the particular basis on which the courts claim to arrive at their
decisions, is whether the amount is reasonable or not. Morse v. Rathburn (1868)
42 Mo. 594; Scofield z Tompkins (i88o) 95 Ill. i9o. There seems to be
considerable confusion, however, as to how the test of reasonableness should be
applied. Some courts compare the sum stipulated with the actual damage
sustained. See Blunt v. Egeland (i9o8) io4 Minn. 351, 354, iI6 N. W. 653,
654; Holland Torpedo Boat Co. vt. Nixon (1908, Sup. Ct.) 6i Misc. Rep. 469,
115 N. Y. Supp. 573. So if no injury results it will be regarded as a penalty.
Dunn v. Morgenthau (I9o3) 73 App. Div. 147, 76 N. Y. Supp. 827, affirmed in
175 N. Y. 518, 67 N. E. io8i. On the other hand, most courts adopt what
seems to be a sounder view, that the comparison should be made between the
amount stipulated and the damages which might reasonably have been expected
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to follow on a breach. Rabinowitz s. Apter (1915) go Conn. i, 96 Atl. I57;
Webster v. Bosanquet [1912, P. C.] A. C. 394; Ellicott Machine Co. v. United
States (19o7) 43 Ct. Cl. 232. It is possible that if the court had applied the
latter doctrine the decision might have been different. It can better be sustained
on the ground that the agreement contained one covenant, among others, the
breach of which could not possibly have resulted in damages as great as the
amount stipulated. Johnson v. Dittes (1917) 137 Minn. 175, 162 N. W. IO78;
Boalware v. Crohn (i9o7) 122 Mo. App. 571, 99 S. W. 796; contra, Madler v.
Silverstone (igog) 55 Wash. I59, IO4 Pac. I65.
EviDENcE-ExTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSIONS-SILENCE ,AFTE AN AccUsATioN-
EFFEcT OF CouNsu-'s ADVIcE.-The defendant and two others were arrested
and taken into custody charged with attempted robbery. One of the participants
made a confession implicating the defendant The latter refused to make any
statement, assigning as his xeason the advice of counsel. The lower court
over objection admitted the accusation and the conduct of the accused, although
it did not then have before it the testimony as to the genuineness of the
defendant's excuse. Held, that the evidence was properly admitted. People v.
Graney (i92o, Calif. App.) 192 Pac. 460.
If a person charged with crime remains silent when accused of guilt, where
the circumstances are such as would naturally call for a denial, the accusation
and his conduct may be introduced in evidence for the jury to determine whether
his silence is to be regarded as an admission of the truth of the accusation.
Kelley v. People (1874) 55 N. Y. 565; People v. Jordan (192o) 292 Ill. 514, i27
N. E. 117; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Igo4) sec. io7i. The accusation, without
proof of the silence of the accused, is never admissible for the truth of the
facts contained in it. Silence, however, is not always equivalent to admission;
it is often explicable as ignorance or dissent and without the background of the
particular occasion has no significance. It is, then, 'the function of the court
to determine as a preliminary question whether the accusation under the circum-
stances called for a reply or whether the accused was in a position where he
could, or the ordinary man would, reply. Weightnovel v. State (i9o3) 46 Fla.
I, 35 So. 856; People v. Byrne (IgII) x60 Calif. 217, in6 Pac. 521. Where
the testimony as to the surrounding circumstances is conflicting, theoretically
the question should be determined by the trial court, but it is the practice of some
courts to leave the question to the jury under proper instructions. State v.
Guffey (1917) 39 S. -D. 84, 163 N. W. 679; State v. Christ (Ig2o, Iowa) I7'
N. W. 54- The courts are in conflict as to when silence is justifiable. Some
hold that the mere fact of arrest is sufficient to excuse a failure to answer.
Bouldin v. State (igo, Tex. Cr. App.) 222 S. W. 555; Ellis v. State (0913)
8 Okla. Cr. App. 522, 128 Pac. IO95. The sounder view would seem to be
that of the instant :case, that arrest is not a ground for exclusion unless it is
shown that the accused was not free to speak. People v. Swaile (i909) 12
Calif. App. 192, io7 Pac. 134; State v. Booker (1gio) 68 W. Va. 8, 69 S. E. 295.
The party offering the evidence must of course prove affirmatively that the
accused heard the statement. Commonwealth v. Brown (i919) 264 Pa. 85,
IO7 Atl. 676. The advice of counsel would also seem to be a proper reason for
silence and a tenable ground for exclusion of the evidence, and it has been so
held in a recent case similar on its facts to the instant case. People v. Conrow
(I911) 2o0 N. Y. 356, 93 N. E. 943.
INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCm'TIEs-By-LAw ABOLISHING PRESUMPTION
OF DEATH.-The defendant's contract of insurance expressly reserved the right
to bind members by subsequently enacted by-laws. After issuance of the
certificate in suit, but before the insured's disappearance, the society enacted a
by-law to the effect. that absence without communication should never entitle a
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beneficiary to recover on the certificate, until the full term of the member's
expectancy in life had expired, and provided that up to such expiration premiums
had been duly paid. The plaintiff, as beneficiary, after presenting proof of the
insured's unexplained absence for over seven years, brought an action to recover
on the certificate. Held, that the plaintiff should recover, as the defendant
could not impair the essential obligations of its contract without the consent of
the insured. Haines v. Modern Woodmen of America (i92o, Iowa) 178 N. W.
1010.
The cases are in conflict as to how far mutual benefit societies can change the
contracts of insurance with their members by subsequently enacted by-laws,
even where the power to amend is expressly reserved. See COMMENTS (1914)
24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337. On the ground that the mutual interests of the
members warranted their regulating their own affairs to the entire exclusion of
the courts, such an amendment as that in the instant case has been held valid.
McGovern v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers (9o9) 31 Ohio
C. C. 243, affirmed in (1911) 85 Ohio, 460, 98 N. E. 1128; Kelly v. Supreme
Council (I899) 46 App. Div. 79, 6I N. Y. Supp. 394. By the weight of authority,
however, such an amendment is not binding, because it is unreasonable. Hannon
v. A. 0. U. W. (1917) 99 Kan. 734, 163 Pac. i69; see L. R. A. 1917 C, IO29,
note; Samberg v. Knights of Maccabees (igog) x58 Mich. 568, 123 N. W. 25.
In some states where the presumption of death from long absence unexplained
has been made statutory, it has been held that the society could not lawfully
make a by-law inconsistent with the specific statutory provision. Sovereign
Camp v. Robinson (i916, Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 215; National Union v.
Sawyer (1914) 42 App. D. C. 475. Even though the member has assented in
advance to any subsequently enacted by-law, the power to amend is not unlimited.
The society cannot materially alter or nullify the essential obligations of its
contract. Parks v. Supreme Circle (914) 83 N. J. Eq. 131, 89 Atl. IO42; Stirn
v. Supreme Lodge (1912) 150 Wis. 13, 136 N. W. 64. A material element of
the contract in the principal case was the right of the beneficiary to recover on
proof of certain facts raising a presumption of death. The subsequent amend-
ment would nullify the society's duty to pay under those circumstances, and
would materially change the performance required of the members or his
beneficiary, by adding a burdensome condition. In this connection, it is inter-
esting to note the tendency of the courts to extend the power to amend the
by-laws to include a change in the rates to be paid. Supreme Lodge v. Mims
(1916) 241 U. S. 574, 36 Sup. Ct. 702; Supreme Lodge v. Smyth (igi) 245
U. S. 594, 38 Sup. Ct. 210. These decisions may be justified on the ground that
without such a change insolvency of the society might destroy the insured's
investment, whereas with the change, ;that investment is preserved as far as
possible, in accordance with the original intention of the parties. See COMMENTS
(914) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337. It is submitted that the instant case is
sqund, and represents the weight of authority.
INSURANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PARoL WAIVER OF CONDITIONS IN A GuAR-
ANTY BOND OF A SURETY COMPANY.--A building contractor took a surety company
bond from a subcontractor. The bond provided for notice of any default on
the part of the subcontractor, and gave the surety company the privilege of
proceeding with the performance of the contract. The subcontractor abandoned.
the work and the agent of the surety company, with authority, verbally waived
the written notice and his principal's privilege to proceed with the work; he then
directed the plaintiff to proceed with the work and render an account of the
expenditures to him. The plaintiff sued on the bond to recover damages
for the default. The defense was the failure of written notice, a condition
precedent in the bond, and the statute of frauds, the promise being to answer
for the default of another. Held. that this was a contract of guaranty insurance,
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and not a contract of suretyship within the statute of frauds, and that therefore
a parol waiver of any of its conditions was valid. Everly v. Equitable Surety
Co. (192o, Ind.) 127 N. E. 616.
It is generally conceded that a contract of fidelity guaranty, where the guaran-
tor is a corporate surety, will be construed by the courts according to rules of
construction of insurance contracts, because of the similarity in the nature ofboth kinds of business. American Bonding Co. v. Morrow (19o6) 8o Ark. 49,
96 S. W. 613; Hunter v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1914) I1
Tenn. 572, 167 S. W. 692; see also Stearns, Suretyship (2d ed. 1915) see. 238.In the application of the insurance rules to such contracts, the courts have been
called on to decide, not the rights of the parties under the contracts, but the
effect of the contract after it has once been performed. Mendow, Oral Contracts
of Fidelity Guaranty (1917) 24 CASE AND COMMENT 42, 44. On the other
hand, the rights of the parties, as well as the validity of the contract, are governed
by the law of suretyship and not of insurance, even where the guarantor is a
surety corporation in the business. Stearns, op. cit., see. 233. It follows,
therefore, that since the validity of a guaranty contract of a compensated surety
corporation is governed by the law of suretyship, it will not be binding unless in
writing, as it is within the statute of frauds, and the payment of a consideration
cannot supply the place of a writing signed by the -person to be charged, orhave the effect of taking out of the statute an agreement that would otherwise
be void. Commonwealth v. Hinson (1911) 143 Ky. 428, 136 S. W. 912; Wain-
wright Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1916) 63 Ind. App.309, 114 N. E. 47o; contra, Quinn-Shepherdson Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. (1919) I42 Minn. 428, 172 N. W. 693; see also Frost, The Law
of Guaranty Insurance (2d ed. 19o9) sec. 6. It seems, however, that the conclu-
sion reached by the court in the principal case is correct and may be justified on
other grounds. As a general rule, a parol waiver by the surety of conditions
in a guaranty bond will not be binding, since the bond itself is required by the
statute of frauds to be in writing. Wainwright Trust Co. v. United StatesFidelity & Guaranty Co. supra. But if one party makes it known that he does
not seek strict performance and thereby causes the other party to fail to perform
a condition, he would be estopped from setting up the other's failure to perform,
as one who has caused a certain situation cannot rely upon it as an excuse for afailure to perform his own obligations. Hellman v. City Trust, Safe Deposit &Surety Co. (19o6) III App. Div. 879, 98 N. Y. Supp. 51; Browne, Statute of
Frauds (5th ed. 1895) sec. 423 ff.; I Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 595. The
courts, in their efforts to protect a premium-paying public, will probably follow
the principal case in holding that guaranty contracts of corporate surety com-panies need not be in writing, though such contracts seem to be within the
statute of frauds.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GARNISHMENT-CITY TREASURER NOT LIABLE TOGARNISHMENT OF MONEY ORDERED PAID TO CONTRAcToR-The city council had
ordered the treasurer of the city to pay the defendant for fire engines. In an
action for damages caused by the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff
tried to garnish the sum due, in the hands of the city treasurer. Held, that thegarnishment process should be quashed, as a city official is not subject to such.
process for reasons of policy. Leiter v. American-La France Fire Engine Co.
(0920, W. Va.) 104 S. E. 56.
The rule generally stated is that a municipal corporation is not subject togarnishment Haddock v. McDonald (19x6) 98 Kan. 628, 159 Pac. 4o2; Tribune
Reporter Printing Co. vt. Homer (1917) 51 Utah, 153, 169 Pac. 170. It follows
that a city official is also exempt. Triebel v,. Colburn (1872) 64 IIl. 376. Thegarnishment statutes are so construed that "person," though including corpora-
tions, does not include municipal corporations. Welch Lumber Co. vt. Carter
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Bros. (i916) 78 W. Va. 11, 88 S. E. 1034; contra, Bray v. Wallingford (i85o)
2o Conn. 416. A similar interpretation is given to the word "corporations."
Underhill v. Calhoun (1879) 63 Ala. 216; contra, Wilson v. Lewis (1872) iO R. I.
285. This exemption is based on reasons of public policy: a public 
corporation,
existing for the welfare of the public, can not be subjected to inconvenience and
expense in order -that one private individual may the better collect a demand
from another; the time of the officers would be consumed; it would lead to
the impoverishment of the public service if salaries could be garnished; and
performance of contracts would be impaired if the means therefor could be
attached. Merwin v. City of Chicago (1867) 45 Ill. 133; Switier v. City of
Wellington (i888) 40 Kan. 250, i9 Pac. 620. The last two reasons have especial
weight, and the garnishment of salaries or of money for contracts not yet
performed is .not generally allowed. Tribune Reporter Co. v. Homer, supra.
But, except for these classes of debts, garnishment is frequently allowed. Mayor
of Jersey City v. Horton (1875) 38 N. J. L. 88; Laredo v. Nalle (I886) 65 Tex.
359. Statutes have indirectly influenced decisions in this direction. 
City of
Denver v. Brown (i888) ii Colo. 337, i8 Pac. 214; Mitchell v. Miller (19o5)
95 Minn. 62, io3 N. W. 716. Express statutory provisions illustrate this 
same
tendency. Ott Hardward Co. v. Davis (193) 165 Calif. 795, 134 Pac. 973.
Where garnishment is not allowed, a bill in equity is sometimes granted. Pendle-
ton v1. Perkins (1872) 49 Mo. 565; Plumnner and Dazis v. School Dist. No. r
(19o9) go Ark. 236, I18 S. W. ioui; contra, Dollar v. Commission Co. (9oo) 78
Miss. 274, 2o So. 876. The view that garnishment should be allowed in the
case of an ordinary debt, as where the contract with the city has been completed,
has the support of Mr. Dillon. I Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911)
sec. 249. A creditor has in general a power to subject all assets of a debtor,
except such as are expressly exempted by law from execution, to payment of
his debts. The immunity of a city which restricts this power should be limited
strictly to those cases where policy strongly requires that such immunity be
granted. The instant case, following precedents in West Virginia, overlooks
all such distinctions and rejects what is submitted to be the more modern and
more liberal tendency.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR TORTS IN CONNECTION WITH ULTRA
VIRES OR "GovERNMENTAL" AcTs.-The officials of the defendant town expelled
the plaintiffs from town by means of unlawful criminal prosecution. The town
by vote authorized or ratified these wrongful acts of its servants; and these
suits were brought by the plaintiffs to recover against the town for malicious
prosecution, abuse of legal process, and conspiracy. Held, that the plaintiffs
should not recover, because the acts complained of were wholly beyond the
powers of the town. Brown v. Town of Edgartown, Norton v. Town of
Edgartown (I920, Mass.) 128 N. E. I.
The law seems to be well settled in most jurisdictions that a municipal
corporation is not liable for torts committed in the exercise of its "governmental"
functions. Bolster v. City of Lawrence (1917) 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722;
Bernstein v. City of Milwaukee (914) 158 Wis. 576, 149 N. W. 382, L. R. A.
1915 C, 435, note'; 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 19iI) 2838. On
the other hand, municipal corporations are generally held liable for torts com-
mitted in the exercise of its so-called "ministerial" duties. Chicago v. Selz
(9o3) 202 Ill. 545, 67 N. E. 386; 4 Dillon, op. cit., 2902. There is a tendency
in some recent cases to hold a nzunicipal corporation liable for torts committed
in the exercise even of its "governmental" duties. Johnston v. City of Chicago
(1913) 258 Ill. 494, I1 N. E. 96o; Kriebel v. Worcester Township (1916) 253 Pa.
452, 98 Atl. 686; see COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, gii. The
courts are almost unanimous in holding that if the tort was committed in
connection with an act which is wholly ultra vires, the town is not liable. 6
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McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1913) 5439; 4 Dillon, op. cit., 2868. The
court in the instant case might have excused the town from liability on the
ground that the tort was committed in the exercise -of its "governmental"
function. In a very recent decision it was held that a town was under a duty
to pay damages in a libel action for tort committed in connection with a
ministerial duty. Stanley v. Town of Sangerville (192o, Me.) iog Atl. i89.
It seems very clear that the acts done in the instant case were "governmental"
as well as ultra vires, and therefore the town might have been excused from
liability on either ground.
MUNICIPAL CORORATIONs-POwER OF A MUNICIPALITY TO ACT BEYOND ITS
CORPOATE BOUNDARIES.-A part of the defendant city bordering on the ocean
was organized into a municipal improvement district, and the city was authorized
by statute to issue bonds of the district for the purpose of supplying the funds
with which to construct improvements therein. Some of the improvements,
which consisted of pleasilre piers and rock jetties, were to lie partially within
the corporate limits and partially on the ocean bed, while others were totally
outside the city limits. The plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer in the improve-
ment district, brought this bill to enjoin the issuance and sale of these bonds.
Held, that the city should be enjoined from issuing bonds for an improvement
outside its corporate -limits. Olney, Lawlor, and Sloane, JJ., dissenting. Mul-
,ille v. City of San Diego (192o, Calif.) 192 Pac. 7o2.
A municipal corporation may exercise those powers: (I) which are expressly
granted, (2) which are necessarily or fairly implied in, or incidental to, the
powers expressly granted, and (3) which are essential to the declared object
and purpose of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable. I
Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th, ed. 1911) 448; City of Independence v.
Cleveland (19o2) 167 Mo. 384, 67 S. W. 216. The general rule is that a city
cannot purchase and hold real estate beyond its territorial limits unless this
power is expressly conferred by the legislature. 3 Dillon op. cit., 1566; Common
Council of the Village of Houghton v. Huron Copper Mining Co. (1885) V;'
Mich. 547, 24 N. W. 82o. Nevertheless there are exceptional purposes for
which a corporation may, without special grant, purchase and hold extra-terri-
torial lands, such as for a pest-house or for a cemetery. 3 Dillon oP. cit., 1567;
City of Champaign v. Harmon (1881) 98 Ill. 491. In dealing with this question
of holding land outside its corporate boundaries some courts have limited the
doctrine and have held that although a city may not extend its governmental
authority, yet it may carry on business for a public purpose beyond the city
limits. Schneider v. Menasha (i9o3) 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94. Thus it has
been held that the power to purchase quarries from which to obtain raw mate-
rials, outside the city, is necessary and convenient to the fulfilment of the
municipality's duty to pave the streets. Somerville v. Waltham (18g8) 170
Mass. 16o, 48 N. &_ 1O92; Lester v. Mayor of Jackson (1892) 69 Miss. 887,
II So. 114; contra, Donable's Adm'r. v. Town of Harrisonburg (195o) 1O4 Va.
533, 52 S. E. 174. The question of the powers of a city to hold extra-territorial
land has been raised in cases where cities had to seek reservoirs and outlets for
sewers outside their limits or have attempted to build wharves along river banks.
In the case of reservoirs and sewer outlets, which are necessary for the public
health, the courts are practically unanimous in considering the holding of land
as indispensable" to the object of the corporation. McLaughlin v. City of Hope
(1913) 1o7 Ark. 442, 155 S. W. 91o; Hall v. Mayor of Calhoun (1913) 14o Ga.
611, 79 S. E. 533. Also a city may have the power as a necessary incident of its
incorporation to acquire property for wharfing. Hafner v. City of St. Louis
(igol) 161 Mo. 34, 61 S. W. 632. A recent Alaska case, with facts similar to
those in the principal case, held that a city had power to build a pier beyond the
high water mark over an arm of the sea separating two parts of the city.
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Town of Ketchikan v. Zimmerman (I911) 4 Alaska 336. Constant increase
in population necessitates the expansion of the city's business powers beyond
its limits in order to provide for parks and other recreation centers which are
no longer possible within the city limits. The instant case does not seem to be
in keeping with the social development of progressive municipalities.
PARTNERSHIP-COVENANT TO REFRAIN FROm BUsINESs-ABROGATION BY PART-
NERSHIP AGRERmENT.-The defendant contracted in writing with the plaintiff to
refrain from writing hail insurance in Childress county. Subsequently, the
plaintiff and the defendant orally agreed to form a partnership to write hail
insurance in Childress county. After the conclusion of this partnership, the
defendant continued to write hail insurance in the county, thus competing with
the plaintiff. This suit was then instituted by the plaintiff to enjoin him from
violating the first contract. Held, that the injunction should be denied, because
the subsequent partnership agreement abrogated the earlier contract. McLeod v.
Schluter (ig2o, Tex. Com. App.) 221 S. W. 961.
There is a square conflict of authority upon the question involved in the
instant case. Manifestly, refraining from competition in the same line of
business is not a part of the good will of a partnership. Burdick, Law of
Partnership (2d ed. i9o6) 372. In the instant case the court argued that under
the first contract it was the defendant's duty not to write hail insurance in
Childress county; but, conceding that the object was to prevent competition
between the parties and that no competition resulted from the formation of the
subsequent partnership, it was the defendant's duty as a partner to write hail
insurance in that county. Therefore the duty imposed by the subsequent
partnership agreement was inconsistent with the duty imposed by the restrictive
covenant and superseded it. Norris v. Howard (1875) 41 Iowa, 5o8; Menefee v.
Rankins (1914) 158 Ky. 78, 164 .S. W. 365. Other courts argue that the defen-
dant's duty under the restrictive covenant is not to write hail insurance in
Childress county in competition with the plaintiff; and that under the partner-
ship agreement it is the duty of the defendant to write hail insurance in Child-
ress county, not in competition, but in conjunction with the plaintiff. Therefore
there is no inconsistency between the two contracts, and the negative covenant
is not abrogated. Scudder v. Kilfoil (1898) 57 N. J. Eq. 171, 4o Atl. 6oz;
Faust v. Rohr (1914) 166 N. C. 187, 8i S. E. io96. This latter view was
followed in the instant case in the lower court. Schluter v. McLeod (1917, Tex.
Civ. App.) 199 S. W. 311. While this decision was here reversed, it seems
more logical, and more in accord with business custom and the actual intentions
of the parties. It is submitted that in the development of this new phase of the
law, the latter view should be adopted.
PRACrlcE-TRI,,Ls-DIsQUALIFIcATION OF JUDGES FOR INTEREST IN CAUsE.-The
defendant was indicted for extortion in his office as district attorney. At the
inception of the prosecution he filed an affidavit alleging that the indictment
had been improperly brought about by the trial judge in order to enhance his
own candidacy in a -prospective judgeship contest between the trial judge and
himself, and that because of the judge's bias and personal interest in the cause
he could not obtain a fair trial. For these reasons he demanded that the judge
recuse himself. The trial judge dismissed the complaint as frivolous and held
the defendant guilty of contempt of court for filing the same. The defendant
appealed. Under a Louisiana statute a judge may be recused on the grounds
of being interested in the cause, relationship within the fourth degree, or
having performed any other judicial act or acts in the cause in court. Held,
that the judge should recuse himself or appoint another judge to determine
upon his recusation, since the grounds of the demand were not frivolous and
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the complaint stated a case within the statute. State v. Nunez (I920, La.) 85
So. 52.
At common law a substantial and direct interest in the event of litigation or
near relationship-generally within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity-were the only grounds for the disqualification of judges. State v. Ham
(191o) 24 S. D. 639, 124 N. W. 955; Ex parte Fairbanks Co. (1912, M.. D. Ala.)
194 Fed. 978. But by statute these grounds have been greatly enlarged upon.
In some states a judge may even be disqualified on grounds of personal bias
and prejudice if it be well established. Powers v. Commonwealth (19o2) 114
Ky. 237, 70 S. W. 644; Ingles v. McMillan (I9II) 5 Okla. Cr. App. 13o, IIj
Pac. 998. As to the sufficiency and nature of the disqualifying interest there
is much diversity of opinion. It is often held that the interest must be a pecu-
niary or proprietary one and capable of clear proof. Northampton v. Smith
(1846, Mass.) ii Metc. 390; Elliot v. Hipp (igio) 134 Ga. 844, 68 S. E. 736.
But the slightest pecuniary or proprietary interest will be sufficient. Moses v.
Julian (1863) 45 N. H. 52; Findley v. Smith (1896) 42 W. Va. 299, 26 S. E.
370. Nor will the court inquire into the extent of the interest or its effect upon
the judge's ruling. Lindsay-Strathmore v. Superior Court (192%, Calif.) 187
Pac. io56. But it is well settled, and in many states specifically provided by
statute, that a judge's mere interest as a citizen and taxpayer in a community
which is a party to or interested in an action before him is not such an interest
in the cause as to disqualify him from sitting. Moses v. Julian, supra; 23 Cyc.
578. Other jurisdictions, even in the absence of statutory provision for disquali-
fication on the grounds of bias or prejudice, have held that "any interest the
probable and natural tendency of which is to create a bias in the mind of the
judge for or against a party to a suit" is sufficient to disqualify him. Bryce v.
Burke (1911) 172 Ala. 219, 55 So. 635. The principal case might be sustained
upon this premise, as the Louisiana statute apparently does not include such a
remote interest as bias and prejudice, in its grounds for the recusation of
judges. The unusual circumstances of the case perhaps justify the liberal
construction of the statute invoked to sustain it.
Pa.oPFaTY-DmDs-RcITAL oF PURIOsE-DISTINCTIoN BETWEEN ABSOLUTE Fm,
CoNDIONiAL FEE, AN EASEENT-The grantor conveyed to the city of Los
Angeles a strip of land dividing his property. The deed contained the usual
granting clause for a conveyance in fee, and the habendum clause which was
limited by a recital that the purpose of the conveyance was for a public road.
The road having been vacated by ordinance, the grantor brought an action of
ejectment to recover possession. Held, that the deed conveyed an absolute fee
with a restrictive covenant. Cooper v. Selig (192o, Calif. App.) 19i Pac. 983.
The instant case follows the generally adopted rule of construction that a mere
recital of purpose will not operate to limit a grant to a conditional fee or to an
easement Fitzgerald v. Modoc County (1913) 164 Calif. 493, 129 Pac. 794; Bald
v. Nuernberger (1915) 267 Ill. 616, Id N. a_ 724; Ann. Cas. x916 B, 6o6, note;
Devlin, Deeds (3d ed. 1911) sec. 970, 97 b. This is universally applied where the
grant is between private individuals aid the grantor expects no special benefit
from the user. Polebitzke v. John Webk Lumber Co. (914) 157 Wis. 377, 147
N. W. 703. Likewise it is so held where'the conveyance is for civic purposes and
the grantor is to benefit only as a member of the community. Thompson v. Hart
(I909) 133 Ga. 540, 66 S. E. 27o; Brady v. Gregory (1912) 49 Ind. App. 355, 97
N. E. 452. When, however, the purpose is specifically to benefit the grantor, a
few courts have adopted a more liberal rule, notably in conveyances made for the
purposes of support Huffman v. Rickets (1916) 6o Ind. App. 526, Il1 N. E. 322.
And this rule has been extended to cases where equity will not grant specific per-
formance and the remedy at law is inadequate. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Annis-
ton Mfg. Co. (1914) i86 Ala. 264, 65 So. 187; Forgeus v. Santa Cruz County
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(1914) 24 Calif. App. 193, 14o Pac. io92 . Whether the grant will then be con-
strued as an easement or as a conditional fee depends upon the adequacy of con-
sideration and the situation of the parties. Robinson v. Missisquoi Ry. (1887)
59 Vt. 426, io Atl. 522; Maxwell v. McCall (igio) I45 Iowa, 687, 124 N. W. 760.
An unusual and doubtful test is proffered in the instant case, namely, the inclusion
in the granting clause of the words "together with . . . the reversion and re-
mainders," vAhich is held to show an intent to create a conditional fee and not an
easement. This confuses reversion with possibility of reverter. See f Tiffany,
Real Property (Ig2o) secs. 129-132. It is suggested that the court in the instant
case might better have served the ends of justice by adopting the more liberal
rule laid down in a previous California decision. See Forgeus v. Santa Cruz
County, supra.
PROPERTY-FIXTURES-RIGHTS OF A CONDITIONAL VENDOR TO ANNEXED CHAT-
TLS.-The Otis Elevator Company installed an elevator plant in the apartment
house of one R under a conditional sales contract which was not recorded.
The plaintiff brought this action under the Washington code against several
other materialmen, a mortgagee of the realty, and the elevator company to
foreclose his materialman's lien. The lower court held that the claims of the
plaintiff, of the other materialmen, and of the mortgagee should be subordinated
to the right of the elevator company to remove the elevator under the contract,
even though they had no actual or constructive notice of it. Held, that the
materialmen's liens should be foreclosed against the elevator as part of the
realty. King v. Blickfeldt (192o, Wash.) 191 Pac. 748.
If the mortgage of the realty is subsequent to the annexation of the chattels
thereto, and the mortgagee has no notice of the claim of the conditional vendor,
the great majority of courts deny the rights of the latter. In re Savage Baking
Co. (igig, D. N. J.) 259 Fed. 976; I Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. i92o) 27r.
If the subsequent mortgagee or even purchaser has notice of the conditional
sale, the conditional vendor has a right to remove the chattels. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. City of Ellensburg (igig, Wash.) 185 Pac. 81I. If the real mortgage
has been executed prior to the annexation of the chattels, the conditional vendor
has a right to remove them. Cox v. New Bern Lighting Co. (i909) 151 N. C.
62, 67 S. E. 477; contra, Meagher v. Hays (189o) 152 Mass. 228, 25 N. E. io5.
However, he is under a duty so to remove the chattels that no substantial
damage will be done to the realty, impairing the security. Hershberger v. John-
son (1900) 37 Ore. io9, 6o Pac. 838. For a discussion of these questions see
COMMENT (1920) 8 CALIF. L. Rv. 442. In the instant case, the materials were
furnished and the mortgage was executed during a period which was substan-
tially contemporaneous with the installation of the elevator plant. Under such
circumstances the court decided that because of the reliance of the materialmen
and of the mortgagee on the fact that the elevator was to become part of the
realty; the elevat company should have no preference over them by reason
of the conditional sales contract of which they had no notice. It is submitted
that this decision meets all the necessities of the case in a satisfactory manner.
The elevator company is not deprived of all remedy. It still has a lien against
the realty generally for materials furnished.
PROPERTY-HUSBAND AND WIFE-ESTATE By ENTIRETIES CREATED IN A DEED
IN SPITE OF WORDS "SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE" IN THE PREMIsES.-The plaintiff
as heir-at-law of the husband of the defendant, claimed a tenancy in common
and brought suit for one half interest in land conveyed to the defendant and
her husband by a deed, in the premises of which were the words "share and
share alike;" but the operative parts of it were in the usual form to convey
an estate by the entireties. The defendant and her husband each contributed
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one half of the purchase price. Held, that an estate by the entireties was created,
in the absence of proof of a clear intention to the contrary, in spite of the
limiting words in the premises. Wilhite v. Wilhite (Ig2o, Mo.) 224 S. W. 448.
The common law regarded the unity of husband and wife as so complete that
neither could dispose of any property deeded to them without the assent of the
other, and the whole estate remained to the survivor. 2 Blackstone, Commen-
taries (8th ed. 1778) 182; see Hiles v. Fisher (1895) x44 N. Y. 306, 31, 39 N. E.
337. The enactment of the married women's acts lias caused a direct conflict
in the authorities on the subject. See 30 L. R. A. 305, 314; 13 R C. L. 111.
Though the tendency is toward the abolition of all forms of joint tenancies,
the instant case still follows the old common-law rule. It has frequently been
held, however, that the words "share and share alike" were indicative of an
intent to create a tenancy in common. Kellogg v. Burnett (i9o8) 74 N. J. Eq.
304, 69 Atl. 196; Xenne v. Jenne (1916) 271 Ill. 526, 1n N. E. 540. The only
objection to the construction in the instant case is the fact that the words occur
in the premises of the deed and not in the operative parts, which simply name
the grantees as "said parties of the second part." These last words seem to
refer to something that has been mentioned above in the document. Common-
wealth v. Schweiters (igo6) 122 Ky. 874, 93 S. W. 592; In re De Rycke's Wil
(19o4) 99 App. Div. 596, 91 N. Y. Supp. 159. It would seem that since "parties
of the second part" was evidently meant to refer to "William and Margaret
Wilhite, share and share alike" the same construction should be given to the
words "share and share alike" as if they were in the operative parts of the deed.
It has been held that estates by the entireties still exist, although the legal unity
which gave rise to them has been abolished, thus showing that their existence to-
day depends upon a legal survival. Holmes v. Kansas City (19o8) 209 Mo. 513,
1o8 S. W. 9. Hence it might well have been argued that the words "share and
share alike" should logically be construed to indicate an intention to create a
tenancy in common. The instant case, however, follows an established rule in
that state. Wilson v. Frost (i9o5) I86 Mo. 311, 85 S. W. 375; Ashbaugh v.
Ashbaugh (1917) 273 Mo. 353, 201 S. W. 72.
SuRETYsHn--DscHAaz OF SuRETY By CHANGE IN RELATION OF PERsoN BoNDED
To OiuzGE.-The defendant surety company gave bonds to the plaintiff bank
covering Syverson as cashier and Flindt as assistant cashier. Syverson was a
director at this time. By these bonds the surety company covenanted to make
good any loss that the bank might sustain by reason of any act of embezzlement
by the "employees" bonded. The bond also provided that the bank might shift
the employee from one position to another within the bank, and that the company
would remain liable in the same manner as if there had been no transfer. Syver-
son and Flindt became holders of the majority of the bank stock and elected
Syverson president and Flindt cashier and director. The third director was a
small stockholder. Both Syverson and Flindt defaulted and the bank sued on
the bonds. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Bank of Willow Lakes v.
Syverson (I92O, S. D.) 178 N. W. 989.
The cashier of a bank is ordinarily the executive and has charge of the routine
business. Burril v. Nahant Bank (184, Mass.) 2 'Met. 163. His functions are
of an importance and responsibility equal to those of the president Hence the
transfer of Syverson from the office of cashier to that of president would seem
to be merely a change of positions within the bank, not attended by any increase
of hazard to the indemnitor and permitted by the express stipulations of the
bond. But when Flindt became cashier and director, his powers and responsi-
bilities, as well as the hazard of the indemnitor, became greatly increased. A
director is not an "employee" of the corporation, nor can he be said to occupy
a "position" in the bank. The directors control the policy of the bank and
direct its officers in the execution of this policy. In conjunction with Syverson,
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Flindt had acquired control of the majority of the bank stock. The position of
the surety is changed from that of surety for two officers in the discharge 
of
their duties to the bank to that of surety for the acts of those in direct 
control
of the bank and owning a majority of its stock. Such a change in its duties can
scarcely be considered as included in the clause allowing a "change of position"
of an "employee" within the bank. In a similar situation where the person
bonded alone obtained a majority of the stock, this same court has held that the
surety was discharged. Farmer's and Merchant's Bank v. United States 
Fidelity
Co. (191i) 28 S. D. 315, 133 N. W. 247. Where there is a specific guaranty of a
specific contract, any change, though not material, in the contract releases 
the
surety. Page v. Krekey (1893) 137 N. Y. 307, 33 N. B. 311; Evans v. Graden
(1894) 125 Mo. 72, 28 S. W. 439. If the contract of guaranty is general, covering
the performance of a number of duties to the obligee, as in the instant 
case, the
usual rule is that a material change in those duties discharges the surety, 
even
though the change is beneficial to the surety. Whitcher v. Hall (1826, K. B.)
5 B. & C. 269; Driscoll v. Winters (i898) i22 Calif. 65, 54 Pac. 387. But in a
number of jurisdictions it has been held that, when it is self-evident without
further inquiry that the change in the duties of the person for whom 
the surety
became obligated is necessarily of benefit to the surety, he is not 
discharged.
Cambridge Bank v. Hyde (i88i) 13i Mass. 77; Ullman Realty Co. v. Hollander
(Igio, City Court N. Y.) 123 N. Y. Supp. 772; Preston v. Huntingdon 
(1887)
67 Mich. 139, 34 N. W. 279. Even under this rule, if the bond is construed not 
to
permit such changes as ensued when Flindt became director it is submitted 
that
it does not follow as a matter of law that such changes may not be 
prejudicial
to the surety company.
Tors-L1ABiLTy :FOR INNOCENT MisREPREsENTATIo.-The defendant's 
agent,
to induce the plaintiff to purchase certain water rights, represented to him 
that
a reservoir had a holding capacity three times as great as it actually had. 
In
this action to recover damages resulting from the misrepresentation, the plain-
tiff's petition did not allege scienter. The lower court overruled the defendant's
demurrer. Held, that the judgment should be affirmed, there being a breach of
duty, although the defendant's agent did not know that his statement was false.
Becker v. McKinnie (i92o, Kan.) i86 Pac. 496.
The leading English case decided that an action of deceit could not be
sustained unless the false representation was made "knowingly, or without
belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false" i. e.,
made with conscious dishonesty. See Derry v. Peek (i889, H. L.) 14 A. C.
337, 374. This case has apparently settled the law in England, although equity
recognizes fraud without mens rea. Nocton v. Ashburton [1914, H. L.] A. C.
932; Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed., igig) sec. 227. American rulings on the
subject lack uniformity. Some courts follow Derry v. Peek in confining the
action to cases where the defendant either knew his statement to be false, or
was conscious that he did not know whether it was true or false. Reno v. Bull
(igi) 226 N. Y. 546, i24 N. E. i44; Peters v'. Lohman (i913) 171 Mo. App.
465, 156 S. W. 783. Others "presume knowledge,' L e., do not require scienter,
if the defendant has peculiar means of knowledge. 12 R. C. L. 335. It has
been suggested that an action on the case for negligence should lie, under
limited circumstances, for misrepresentations made carelessly, though honestly;
negligent words may cause as much damage as negligent acts. Jeremiah Smith,
Liability for Negligent Language (900) i4 H.Rv. L. Rnv. 184; Cunningham v.
Pease House Furnishing Co. (igo8) 74 N. H. 435, 69 Atl. 12o. But there are
objections to throwing the matter into the law of negligence. See Williston,
Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1I11) 24 HA1v. L. Rnv. 415, 436. It is
submitted that justice is accomplished by those courts which, in a limited
class of cases, support actions akin to deceit without requiring scienter. They
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really allow recovery for negligence, which seems sound, and yet they avoid
the difficulties of an action of negligence eo nomine. This would seem a just
and conservative departure from the older conception of "deceit" as involving
conscious dishonesty. The instant case seems clearly sound, and is in accord
with previous Kansas decisions. Bice v. Nelson (igig) 1O5 Kan. 23, i8o Pac.
2o6.
TORTs-MALIcIous PRosEcuTION-CiviL AcTIoN-ABsENCE OF INTEFERENcE
WITH PERSON OR PRoPERTY.-The defendant had harassed the plaintiff, by insti-
tuting civil suits against her and dismissing them on appearance of counsel, in
the hopes of extorting money from her. There had been no seizure of her prop-
erty or interference with her person. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in an action for malicious prosecution the defendant appealed. Held, that the
action did not lie for merely beginning a civil action, unless property or person
had been wrongfully seized or in some manner injuriously affected by process
issued therein. Pye v. Cardwell (I92o, Tex. Civ. App.) 224 S. W. 542.
There are two views concerning the essential elements of the tort of malicious
prosecution of a civil action. According to the first, the cause of action is de-
pefident upon the nature of the injury resulting frbm the commencement of the
suit. Where there is a special injury to reputation, to property, or to person a
cause of action arises. Luby v. Bennett (igoi) iii Wis. 613, 87 N. W. 8o4;
Lawrence v. Hagerman (I87O) 56 Ill. 68; Chapin, Torts (1917) 477. Where
there was no special injury, as in the instant case, no recovery is allowed. Weber-
Pleuthert Co. v. Leventhal (ioi8, Sup. Ct.) 103 Misc. 8o, 169 N. Y. Supp. 248.
Some courts on this principle hold that the defendant has his action if he shows
special damages over and above taxable costs. Carbondale Investment Co. v.
Burdick (19o3) 67 Kan. 329, 72 Pac. 781. By the other and preferable view one
has no legal privilege to commence an action with malice and without probable
cause. The act of commencing is the tort, the injury resulting being merely the
measure of damages. Kolka v. Jones (1897) 6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558; Peerson
v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills (1918) 2oi Ala. 348, 78 So. 204; see (I918) 6 MIcH. L.
REV. 653; (i918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 85. The action of malicious prosecution
existed at common law. Waterer v. Freeman (164o) Hob. 205, 266; I Co. Lit
16ia; see Lawson, The Action for the Malicious Prosecution. of a Civil Suit
(1882) 3o Am. L. REG. 281, 283. But the Statute of Marlbridge [52 Hen. III c. 6
(1267)] took away the necessity for it by allowing heavy costs to the defendant
in actions brought pro falso clamore. Thereafter the action was denied unless
some special injury was shown. Saville v. Roberts (1698, K. B.) 1 Ld. Raym.
374. American Courts following the English rule lack the fundamental reason
for it, as costs awarded in American courts do not pretend to approximate the
expenses of litigation. See Kolka v. Jones (1897) 6 N. D. 461, 466, 71 N. W.
558, 561. It is also said in support of the rule of the instant case that honest
litigants will be deterred from coming into court and that the courts will be
crowded with actions of malicious prosecution if a contrary policy should be
adopted. Such, however, has not been the result. See Peerson v. Ashcraft
Cotton Mills, supra (I918). Nor does much harm seem to have resulted from
arming "fraudulent debtors with a right to recover damages through perjured
testimony." The tendency now appears to be opposed to the principal case.
Teesdalc v. Liebchwager (igig, S. D.) 17"4 N. W. 62o; see.26 Cyc. 15; L. R. A.
1918 D, 550, 555. It is suggested that a solution of the question lies in legislation
granting costs and damages to a successful defendant when he could prove the
suit was brought maliciously and without probable cause.
